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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
vs. 
UTAH STATE BAR and 
STEPHEN HUTCHINSON,, 
Defendants and 
Appellants, 
I. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent commenced this action to obtain an Order 
requiring Appellants to disclose salary information concerning 
employees to Respondent. Summary Judgment was entered in favor 
of Respondent. This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-2-2(3)(i). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review on this 
Appeal: 
1. Is the Appellant Utah State Bar (the "Bar") a state 
agency and therefore required to disclose to Respondent Brian M. 
Barnard ("Barnard") salary information concerning the Bar's 
employees under the provisions of the Archives and Records 
Services and Information Practices Act (Utah Code Ann., Sec. 
63-2-59, et seq.) (hereinafter the "Records Act") and the Public 
and Private Writings Act (Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-26-1, et seq.) 
(hereinafter the "Writings Act")? 
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2. Can either the Records Act or the Writings Act be 
constitutionally applied to the Bar? 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Proceedings in the Court Below. 
Barnard commenced this action against the Bar and its 
Executive Director, Stephen F. Hutchinson ("Hutchinson"), 
seeking an Order requiring the Bar to disclose to him the exact 
salaries and benefits received by all employees of the Bar on 
the basis that the Bar is allegedly a state agency and is 
therefore required to disclose this information pursuant to the 
provisions of the Records Act and the Writings Act. Barnard 
also sought punitive damages and attorneys1 fees. 
Shortly after the Complaint was filed, Barnard moved for 
Summary Judgment. On May 9, 1988, the Court, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, granted Barnard's Motion for Summary 
Judgment requiring the Bar to disclose the salary information to 
Barnard, but denied Barnard's demand for punitive damages and 
attorneys' fees. Execution on the Judgment was stayed pending 
appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Barnard is a member of the Bar. [R. 22] In November 
1987, Barnard requested information concerning salaries and 
benefits paid to Bar employees. [R. 23] In response, the Bar 
voluntarily provided him salary ranges for different categories 
of Bar employees and a description of fringe benefits for the 
Bar staff. [R. 24] 
Not satisfied with the information provided by the Bar, 
Barnard filed this lawsuit contending that the Bar is a state 
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Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 4. The Supreme Court has 
delegated to the Bar certain responsibilities. However, all 
decisions by the Bar and its authorized committees concerning 
the admission, suspension or disbarment of members of the Bar 
are advisory only to the Supreme Court, which retains the 
constitutional power to admit, discipline or disbar members of 
the Bar. [R. 102] 
Although the Bar in all its functions is subject to the 
supervision and control of the Supreme Court, the Bar engages in 
numerous activities other than the admission and discipline of 
attorneys which the Supreme Court has not chosen to directly 
regulate or supervise such as semi-annual Bar meetings, various 
educational courses and seminars, a newsletter and the Law and 
Justice Center in Salt Lake City. [R. 102-103] 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Bar is Not a State Agency. 
The Bar is not a state agency and is therefore not 
subject to the Records Act or the Writings Act. Although the 
Bar was "perpetuated, created and continued" by the Supreme 
Court and is subject to strict regulation, the Bar privately 
owns its property and pays taxes and is governed by its own 
by-laws just like other private organizations. Although the 
Supreme Court has delegated certain administrative functions 
relating to the admission and discipline of attorneys to the Bar 
and with regard to those functions the Bar acts as an agent or 
arm of the Court, that does not make the Bar a state agency for 
all purposes. 
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Although the Records Act: purports to apply to "officers 
of any court," there appears or; the face of the statute 
to be an equally compelling argument that t^e £ :t was 
not intended to apply to tine judicial brancn of state 
government. In 1 i 1 a 1 1e g ar d, Sec, 62-2-79 states: 
11U p o n r e q u e s t, t h e a r c h i v i s t shall assist and 
advise the establishment of records-management 
programs in the legislative and judicial branches 
of state government and shall, as required by 
them, provide program services similar to those 
available to the executive branch of state 
government p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s 
' \ '" I" if ' 1 1 ( ""i nirit" i i i l l 1 :»( ::] "I 
The Writings Act neither utilizes nor defines the term "state 
agency". Rather, the Writings Act refers to "public writings" 
and "public officers". The bar would concede, however, that 
ifthe Bar is in fact a "state agency", the Writings Act on its 
face applies to the Bar. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never had occasion to address 
the issue of whether the Bar is somehow to be considered a state 
agency. However, an analysis of the organization and operation 
of the Bar, as well as relevant judicial decisions, leads to the 
conclusion that the Bar should not be considered a state agency, 
but a private organization which performs certain public 
functions and is regulated and supervised by the Supreme Court 
as are all attorneys. 
The Bar is an unincorporated, non-profit organization 
which the Supreme Court "perpetuated, created and continued" 
when it integrated the Bar in 1981. The Bar was initially 
organized in 1931. In many respects, the Bar functions as a 
professional association. The Bar has the authority and 
capacity to sue and to be sued, to execute contracts and to hold 
and dispose of property. In this connection, the Utah Supreme 
Court has made it very clear in its rules that the Bar's 
property, both real and personal, is private property, owned by 
the Bar, and is not owned by the state. [Rule (A)l, Rules for 
That section seems to contemplate an elective not 
mandatory program by the legislative and judicial 
branches, therefore implying applicability only to the 
executive branch. 
Integration and Management of the Utah State Bar.] Further, the 
Bar pays taxes both on its real and personal property. Private' 
ownership of property and liability for taxes are both 
absolutely and totally irreconcilable with any notion that the 
Bar is a state agency. Indeed, by filing this action, Barnard 
implicitly recognized that the Bar is not a state agency because 
he didn't even attempt to give a notice of claim which would 
have been required before filing suit against a state agency. 
See, U.C.A., Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12. 
Although the Supreme Court regulates and supervises the 
Bar by virtue of its constitutional power to govern the practice 
of law, the Bar is in large part self-governed through Bar 
commissioners which are elected by Bar members, and an Executive 
Director who is selected by the commissioners. Further, the Bar 
was authorized by the Supreme Court to and has in fact adopted 
its own bylaws. Although the Supreme Court has the power to 
regulate all functions of the Bar, the Court has not chosen to 
regulate or supervise many of its activities, such as 
educational courses and seminars, Bar meetings, a newsletter and 
the Law and Justice Center. The Bar does not receive any public 
funds, but is funded solely by dues and fees paid by its members 
and Bar applicants. The employees of the Bar are not paid by 
the state, nor are they entitled to any of the benefits enjoyed 
by state employees, such as membership in a state retirement 
plan or insurance. 
In the Trial Court, Barnard contended that because the 
Bar was created by the Supreme Court and/or the Legislature and 
is regulated and supervised by the Supreme Court, the Bar is a 
state agency. This conclusion simply does not follow. 
For example, in Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 
P.2d 406 (Utah 1986), the Utah Technology Finance Corp. ("UTFC") 
had been created by the Legislature in 1985 and funded with One 
Million Dollars ($1,000,000) of public funds for the purpose of 
assisting in the development of small high-tech businesses. By 
statute, the State Treasurer was made the custodian of all of 
the funds appropriated to the UTFC, as well as any other funds 
that the UTFC acquired. The UTFC was required to make an annual 
report to the Governor and was subject to annual audit by the 
State Auditor. The UTFC was governed by trustees appointed for 
three-year terms by the Governor with the consent of the 
Senate. Thus, the UTFC was created by the Legislature, was 
funded with tax monies and was subject to strict regulation and 
control by the state. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that 
the UTFC was not a state agency, but was intended by the 
Legislature to be, and in fact was, an independent, public 
non-profit corporation. 
The case of Matter of Washington State Bar Association, 
548 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1976), is also instructive. There, the 
Washington State Auditor sought to audit the Washington State 
Bar under a statute giving him the power to audit any state 
agency or department. The Auditor argued that the fact that the 
State Bar Act of 1933 referred to the Washington Bar as "an 
agency of the state" was determinative on the issue of whether 
the Bar was a state agency and thus subject to audit. The 
Washington Supreme Court determined that the meaning of the term 
"agency" depends on its context and held that the Legislature 
did not intend to subject the Bar to audits and that the Bar was 
not a state agency within the meaning of the subject statute. 
Barnard argued, and the District Court ruled, that the 
case of Redding v. Brady, 606 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1980), is 
controlling in the case at bar. It is respectfully submitted 
that Redding provides little guidence in the present case. All 
the Supreme Court decided in Redding was that Weber State 
College was a public institution, heavily dependent upon tax 
funds for its operation, and, therefore, was required to 
disclose the salaries of its employees under the Records Act. 
Appellants have no quarrel with the Redding case. Obviously, 
Weber State College is a public institution. The Bar is not. 
In this connection, it is important to note that the Supreme 
Court justified the right of the public to access to the salary 
information upon the basis that Weber State College received 
public tax funds and the public had a right to know how its 
taxes were being spent. The Bar does not receive any tax monies 
or any other funds from the state. 
The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to govern 
the practice of law in the State of Utah. That power includes 
the power to regulate and control attorneys who are officers of 
the court. The authority which the Supreme Court has given to 
the Bar in the areas of licensing and discipline is simply a 
delegation of certain of the Supreme Court's powers. In re 
Disciplinary Action of McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986); In re 
Utah State Bar Petition, Etc., 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1981). The 
Supreme Court could just as well have delegated those 
responsibilities to specific attorneys or other individuals. 
The fact that the Supreme Court has chosen to delegate certain 
responsibilities with respect to the admission and discipline of 
the members of the Bar to the Bar itself, probably means that 
the Bar engages in "state action" insofar as certain 
constititional issues such a due process are concerned when the 
Bar performs those specifically delegated functions. However, 
that does not mean that the Bar itself is somehow transformed 
into a state agency for all purposes. 
In this regard, "public officers" are subject to the 
provisions of the Records Act. Sec. 63-2-61 of that Act defines 
"public officers" as including "officers of any court." All 
attorneys are officers of the courts. In re Disciplinary Action 
of McCune, 717 P.2d at 705. Certainly, Barnard would not argue 
that therefore all attorneys are public officers and subject to 
the provisions of the Records Act. The mere fact that attorneys 
or the Bar itself may be considered officers of the Supreme 
Court or as acting by its authority does not transform them into 
a state agency. 
In summary, the Bar is a private organization which is 
largely self-governing but which is subject to the regulation 
and control of the Supreme Court (just as all attorneys are) and 
which has been delegated by the Supreme Court certain 
responsibilities to police its own members. There is absolutely 
no indication, either in the legislative history of previously 
applicable statutes, or in the superceding rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court, that the Bar was intended to be a state agency. 
Indeed, such a holding would be absolutely irreconcilable with 
the Supreme Court rule recognizing the Bar's right to privately 
own property and the fact that the Bar is required to pay taxes. 
B. The Statutes Cannot be Constitutionally Applied to 
the Bar. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the Bar is a 
state agency, neither the Records Act nor the Writings Act can 
constitutionally be applied to the Bar. 
In its official functions, the Bar is an arm of the 
Supreme Court. The statutes cannot constitutionally be applied 
to the Bar because the Supreme Court has the sole constitutional 
right to administer the judicial department and govern the 
practice of law. 
Art. V, Sec. 1, of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah 
shall be divided into three distinct departments, 
the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments 
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either 
of the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, of the Utah Constitution provides in 
part: 
The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice 
of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
practice law. 
The Legislature has no power or authority as to which of 
the judiciary's records shall be opened to the public or the 
process by which that determination is made. To allow the 
Legislature to do so would be an impermissible incursion upon 
the prerogatives of the Supreme Court. 
For example, the Writings Act expressly includes as a 
public writing "judicial records". Utah Code Ann., Sec. 
78-26-1(2). The Writings Act then goes on to provide that, 
"every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any 
public writing or this state except as otherwise expressly 
provided by statute." Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-26-2. This 
statute would purport to deny the courts the right to seal case 
files. Although there is a common law right for the public to 
inspect court records, that right is not absolute and it is up 
to the courts to decide in a given case whether that right is 
outweighed by competing interests. See, Huntsman-Christensen 
Corp. v. Entrada Industries, 639 F.Supp. 733 (D.Utah 1986). 
In Pasik v. State Board of Law Examiners, 478 N.Y.S.2d 
270 (N.Y. 1984), the plaintiff sought certain information from 
the New York Bar concerning his Bar exam pursuant to the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Law. The Court held 
that plaintiff was not entitled to this information as the 
judiciary was expressly exempted from the Law and that the Bar 
in the discharge of its official duties was a part of the 
judiciary. 
In Matter of Washington State Bar Assoc, supra, the 
Court held that the Washington State Bar Assoc, was not subject 
to audit by the State Auditor under the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine. The Court observed: 
There is yet another ground that renders 
petitioner's attempted audit inappropriate. We 
have earlier made clear that the regulation of the 
practice of law in this state is within the 
inherent power of this Court. This is the holding 
of the vast majority of courts in this country that 
have considered this issue. [Citations omitted] 
. . •
 ,f[T]his Court does not share the power 
of discipline, disbarrment, suspension or 
reinstatement with either the Legislature or the 
State Bar Association. The ultimate constitutional 
power clearly lies within the sole jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court." . . . We also there established 
that in spite of the language of the State Bar Act, 
the association was not an "agency of government" 
so as to be one of the "state executive offices" 
required . . . to move their principal place of 
business to the seat of government. The State Bar 
Association, we recognized, is an association that 
is sui generis many of whose important functions 
are directly related and in aid of the judicial 
branch of government. 
. . . The Legislature's characterization of 
the Bar as an "agency of the state" does not 
deprive this Court of its right of control of the 
Bar and its functions as a separate, independent 
branch of government. [548 P.2d at 315-316] 
Similarly, in Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 
S.W.2d 682 (KY. 1980), the Court held that the Auditor of Public 
Accounts of the State of Kentucky was not entitled to audit the 
books and accounts of the Kentucky Bar Association, observing: 
As we have indicated, we have no doubt that 
the General Assembly has the authority to require 
an accounting of funds it has appropriated from 
revenues it has caused to be raised. What we have 
in this case, however, are funds that have not been 
collected pursuant to any statute and have no been 
appropriated by the legislative body and are not 
subject to legislative appropriation. Both the 
Association and the Board of Bar Examiners exists 
solely by virtue of rules of this Court expressly 
and exclusively authorized by Const. Sec. 116. 
There is no constitutional authority by which they 
can be made accountable to either of the other two 
branches of government except for their stewardship 
of such funds or property as may come into their 
possession through these sources. Neither of those 
agencies has any such funds or property. Their 
funds and property are public funds and property 
because their official functions are entirely 
public in nature, but their accountability is to 
this Court only, of which they are an integral 
part. [jEd. at 686] 
In summary, it is not for the Legislature to determine 
what records the judiciary will and will not make public or to 
prescribe the manner in which such a determination is made. The 
Bar is an arm of the judiciary. Consequently, neither the 
Records Act nor the Writings Act can constitutionally be applied 
to the Bar. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the Summary Judgment entered in favor of Barnard should be 
reversed with directions to enter Judgment in favor of the Bar. 
DATED this 8th day of September, 1988. 
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